Gottlob Frege On Sense And Reference PdfBy Constance D. In and pdf 19.05.2021 at 05:45 8 min read
File Name: gottlob frege on sense and reference .zip
The reference or "referent"; Bedeutung of a proper name is the object it means or indicates bedeuten , whereas its sense Sinn is what the name expresses.
- Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later
- Frege: ON SENSE AND REFERENCE
- Frege on Identity as a Relation of Names
Gottlob Frege — German philosopher and mathematician, founder of modern logic.
Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later
The reference or "referent"; Bedeutung of a proper name is the object it means or indicates bedeuten , whereas its sense Sinn is what the name expresses. The reference of a sentence is its truth value , whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses.
Much of analytic philosophy is traceable to Frege's philosophy of language. Frege developed his original theory of meaning in early works like Begriffsschrift concept script of and Grundlagen foundations of arithmetic of On this theory, the meaning of a complete sentence consists in its being true or false,  and the meaning of each significant expression in the sentence is an extralinguistic entity which Frege called its Bedeutung , literally meaning or significance, but rendered by Frege's translators as reference, referent, ' M eaning', nominatum, etc.
Frege supposed that some parts of speech are complete by themselves, and are analogous to the arguments of a mathematical function , but that other parts are incomplete, and contain an empty place, by analogy with the function itself. Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence — its truth value — appear.
This early theory of meaning explains how the significance or reference of a sentence its truth value depends on the significance or reference of its parts. Frege introduced the notion of "sense" German: Sinn to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value.
If the evening star has the same reference as the morning star , it follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun. But it is possible for someone to think that the first sentence is true while also thinking that the second is false.
Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its sense. Second, sentences that contain proper names with no reference cannot have a truth value at all.
Yet the sentence 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep' obviously has a sense, even though 'Odysseus' has no reference. The thought remains the same whether or not 'Odysseus' has a reference. For example, Mont Blanc , 'with its snowfields', cannot be a component of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4, metres high.
Nor can a thought about Etna contain lumps of solidified lava. Frege's notion of sense is somewhat obscure, and neo-Fregeans have come up with different candidates for its role. John McDowell supplies cognitive and reference-determining roles.
In his theory of descriptions , Bertrand Russell held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact disguised definite descriptions.
For example, 'Aristotle' can be understood as "The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander", or by some other uniquely applying description. This is known as the descriptivist theory of names. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory.
Thus Russell's theory of descriptions was conflated with Frege's theory of sense, and for most of the twentieth century this "Frege—Russell" view was the orthodox view of proper name semantics. However, Saul Kripke argued compellingly against the descriptivist theory. According to Kripke,  : 48—49 proper names are rigid designators which designate the same object in every possible world.
Descriptions such as "the President of the U. For example, someone other than Richard Nixon , e. Lyndon B. Johnson , might have been the President in Hence a description or cluster of descriptions cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot mean the same as a description.
However, the Russellian descriptivist reading of Frege has been rejected by many scholars, in particular by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference  and by John McDowell in "The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name",  following Michael Dummett , who argued that Frege's notion of sense should not be equated with a description.
Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. He and McDowell both take the line that Frege's discussion of empty names, and of the idea of sense without reference, are inconsistent, and that his apparent endorsement of descriptivism rests only on a small number of imprecise and perhaps offhand remarks.
And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction does have i. As noted above, translators of Frege have rendered the German Bedeutung in various ways. The term 'reference' has been the most widely adopted, but this fails to capture the meaning of the original German 'meaning' or 'significance' , and does not reflect the decision to standardise key terms across different editions of Frege's works published by Blackwell.
However, while Frege's own use of the term can sound as odd in German for modern readers as when translated into English, the related term 'deuten' does mean 'to point towards'.
Though 'Bedeutung' is not usually used with this etymological proximity in mind in German, German speakers can well make sense of 'Bedeutung' as signifying 'reference', in the sense of it being what 'Bedeutung' points, i. Moreover, 'meaning' captures Frege's early use of Bedeutung well,  and it would be problematic to translate Frege's early use as 'meaning' and his later use as 'reference', suggesting a change in terminology not evident in the original German.
According to Susan Prince, this "suggests that he makes a distinction between sense and reference". The Stoic theory of lekta refers to a correspondence between speech and the object referred to by the speech, as distinct from the speech itself. This has been cited as an anticipation of the distinction between sense and reference.
The sense-reference distinction is commonly confused with that between connotation and denotation , which originates with John Stuart Mill. But according to Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract concept Begriff. We must distinguish between the relation of reference, which holds between a proper name and the object it refers to, such as between the name 'Earth', and the planet Earth , and the relation of 'falling under', such as when the Earth falls under the concept planet.
The relation of a proper name to the object it designates is direct, whereas a word like 'planet' has no such direct relation to the Earth at all, but only to a concept that the Earth falls under.
Moreover, judging of anything that it falls under this concept is not in any way part of our knowledge of what the word 'planet' means. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For other uses, see Sinn disambiguation. On Sense and Reference. Hans Kaal, Oxford: Blackwell See also Frege's letter to Russell dated , in the same collection. Henle, M. Kallen, and S. Langer, eds. John McDowell ed. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. New Series.
The translation of Bedeutung by 'meaning' was unanimously agreed after lengthy discussion'. Bell', Analysis 40 pp. See also Bell, D. Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary. University of Michigan Press. Routledge, p. Philosophy of language. Index of language articles. Ayer G. Causal theory of reference Contrast theory of meaning Contrastivism Conventionalism Cratylism Deconstruction Descriptivism Direct reference theory Dramatism Dynamic semantics Expressivism Linguistic determinism Mediated reference theory Nominalism Non-cognitivism Phallogocentrism Relevance theory Semantic externalism Semantic holism Structuralism Supposition theory Symbiosism Theological noncognitivism Theory of descriptions Definite description Unilalianism Verification theory.
Category Task Force Discussion. Analytic philosophy. Epistemology Language Mathematics Science. Aretaic Linguistic. Classical Mathematical Non-classical Philosophical.
Analysis paradox of analysis Analytic—synthetic distinction Counterfactual Natural kind Reflective equilibrium Supervenience. Charlie Broad Norman Malcolm G. Ramsey Ludwig Wittgenstein. Anscombe J. Austin A. Ernest Nagel. Carl Gustav Hempel Hans Reichenbach. Quine John Rawls. David Chalmers J. Mackie Peter Singer J. James F. Conant Alice Crary Cora Diamond.
Category Index. Formal semantics natural language. Antecedent-contained deletion Cataphora Coercion Counterfactuals Cumulativity De dicto and de re De se Deontic modality Discourse relations Donkey anaphora Epistemic modality Faultless disagreement Free choice inferences Givenness Cataphora Crossover effects Hurford disjunction Inalienable possession Intersective modification Logophoricity Mirativity Modal subordination Negative polarity items Opaque contexts Performatives Privative adjectives Quantificational variability effect Rising declaratives Scalar implicature Sloppy identity Subsective modification Telicity Veridicality.
Alternative semantics Categorial grammar Combinatory categorial grammar Discourse representation theory Dynamic semantics Generative grammar Glue semantics Inquisitive semantics Intensional logic Lambda calculus Segmented discourse representation theory Situation semantics Supervaluationism Montague grammar Type theory TTR.
Cognitive semantics Computational semantics Distributional semantics Formal grammar Inferentialism Linguistics wars Philosophy of language Pragmatics Semantics of logic. Categories : Philosophy of language Philosophical logic Conceptual distinctions Meaning philosophy of language. Hidden categories: All pages needing factual verification Wikipedia articles needing factual verification from December Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history.
Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version.
Frege: ON SENSE AND REFERENCE
In this video Professor Thorsby offers an introduction to contemporary philosophy, beginning with the work of Gottlob Frege. Mendelsohn conjectures that the reason Frege's philosophy of language has subsequently received so much more attention lies with Frege's adoption of compositionality principles, according to which the sense and reference of complex expressions depend, in a rule-governed way, on the sense and reference of their parts. A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? Little is known about his youth. Frege's notion of Bedeutungis one of the most controversial notions in his philosophy.
One example of this is the naming relation, for example hearing the words "George W. Bush" and relating them to the actual entity in our world, the President in this case. References are determined by certain descriptions. For example, the references "adult", "married", and "male" may form the reference for "bachelor".
Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: Equality  gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation?
Gottlob Frege was a German logician, mathematician and philosopher who played a crucial role in the emergence of modern logic and analytic philosophy. He invented modern quantificational logic, and created the first fully axiomatic system for logic, which was complete in its treatment of propositional and first-order logic, and also represented the first treatment of higher-order logic. In the philosophy of mathematics, he was one of the most ardent proponents of logicism, the thesis that mathematical truths are logical truths, and presented influential criticisms of rival views such as psychologism and formalism. His theory of meaning, especially his distinction between the sense and reference of linguistic expressions, was groundbreaking in semantics and the philosophy of language. He had a profound and direct influence on such thinkers as Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein.
Frege on Identity as a Relation of Names
There is a major issue about how one of Frege's key terms is to be translated. The German word is " Bedeutung ", and it is the term being translated as "reference" in the title of the paper. It is translated "nominatum" in the older translation available through the JStor link, and it has also been translated "denotation". In ordinary German, however, it just means "meaning", and so it is also sometimes translated that way for example, in Frege's Collected Papers and Posthumous Writings.
Электроснабжение уже наверняка восстановили. - Он открыл жалюзи. - Все еще темно? - спросила Мидж. Но Бринкерхофф не ответил, лишившись дара речи. То, что он увидел, невозможно было себе представить. Стеклянный купол словно наполнился то и дело вспыхивающими огнями и бурлящими клубами пара. Бринкерхофф стоял точно завороженный и, не в силах унять дрожь, стукался лбом о стекло.